SWIF Philosophy of Mind updated: September 20, 2001. http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/topics/phen_rep.htm
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 Topics
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Representational Theories of Phenomenal Content

Chris Lau chris.lau@hertford.ox.ac.uk (Hertford College, Oxford University)
Joe Lau jyflau@hku.hk (Department of Philosophy, The University of Hong Kong)

 

The phenomenal content or phenomenal properties of a mental state concerns what it is like to be in that state. Part of the phenomenal content of pain, for example, is its distinctively undesirable feeling. Phenomenal properties are sometimes also called raw feels, phenomenal characters, qualitative characters, or qualia.

Various theories have been proposed about the nature of phenomenal content. Some philosophers have argued that phenomenal content is non-physical ( e.g. Jackson(1982), Chalmers (1996) ). Among those who accept some form of physicalism, one important recent issue concerns the relationship between representational and phenomenal content. On the face of it, for many conscious mental states, there seems to be some systematic relationship between their phenomenal and representational content. For example, what it is like to see a rotating blue square is certainly differently from what it is like to see a stationary green circle.

There are two questions here. The first is whether the phenomenal content of a mental state supervenes on its representational content. If so, the second question is whether phenomenal content is reducible to representational content. According to Block (1995), the answer to the first question is negative. Others, such as Harman (1990), Tye (1996), Dretske (1995), and Lycan (1996), disagree. Many argue further in relation to the second question that the phenomenal content of a mental state is simply one and the same as its representational content. These representational theories of phenomenal content being put forward can be classified into two kinds. According to the narrow theories ( e.g. Carruthers (2000), Rey (1998) ), phenomenal content is a special sort of narrow representational content, a certain kind of content that supervenes solely on the internal physical constitution of a subject. However, others argue that phenomenal content is constituted by wide representational content, content that supervenes in part on how a subject is related to its external environment.

References

Selection of related web links

Essays defending representational theories of consciousness

Responses and essays against representational theories

Other related essays

Bibliography

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© 2001 Chris Lau and Joe Lau