Marco Salucci

SWIF Philosophy of Mind, 15 March 2001 http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/salucci.htm

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Before Idealism

Marco Salucci
Department of Philosophy
University of Florence (Italy)
salucci.m@tin.it
One of the main attacks to physicalism mounted by Hutto derives from the classical argument of Nagel and Jackson: the knowledge argument. Hutto emphasizes an important feature of such an argument, a feature that is often underestimated by the literature about the subject. There is a physically inexplicable residual that comes from the fact that it is impossible to know what it is like to be a certain x because we would have to be that x . I agree that this is the problem posed to physicalism by the knowledge argument (as I have claimed in Materialismo e funzionalismo nella filosofia della mente, Pisa, ETS 1996), But I am more cautious than Hutto in drawing from it the antiphysicalist conclusion. The point of the knowledge argument is that different creatures cannot share mental states, but this point is not incompatible with identity theory. That mental states cannot be shared might be a banal consequence of the impossibility to share the brain states these mental states are identical to. Therefore, the question we have to ask is: does the fact that mental/brain states are not shareable imply that there is no explanation of how mental states originate, "emerge", "supervene" and so on from brain states or are identical with them?

I do not think so. The answer depends on what we mean by explanation. If in the future, neuroscience will show how mental states originate from brain states and also how some physical systems (brains) have the property to feel what it is like to be what they are, then, I think, this would be a fully satisfactory explanation (see my Is consciousness a brain state?, in << Iride >> May-August 2000, the abstract is available in this site).

Obviously the kind of explanation I am referring to is not available now. If it will be, only future science will provide it. However, the reference to future science leads us to another attack against physicalism devised by Hutto. Crane and Mellor proposed this type of criticism about ten years ago. They claimed that physicalism is either false, if it is based on the current science, or empty if it is based on future science. The first option is, obviously, a false target (although sometimes Hutto seems to take it seriously) because no physicalist ever claimed that present science is able to explain mental phenomena (behaviourism and the famous identification of pain with the excitation of C-fibers firing are obsolete proposals). As to the second option I must confess I do not understand it, because I cannot see the difference between asserting that <<future science will find the cure for cancer>> and <<future science will find the explanation for the origin of consciousness>>. Either they are both acceptable (this means: they are meaningful, not empty and not trivial, no matter if they will be stated as true or false) or they both can be rebutted. If somebody claims that consciousness makes the difference, we are clearly facing a question begging. It is already assumed, without argument, that consciousness cannot be a scientific object. Hutto’s discussion about the Object-based Schema and the efforts to use space-time notions in order to grasp objectivity shows how difficult it is to have a definition for physical object, and therefore how badly founded physicalism is. But physicalists do not have to give a definition for physical object, since this is the task of science. The history of science, from seventeenth century mechanism to contemporary relativity and quantum mechanics, shows how the concept of physical object has changed according to science.

At this point, clarification is needed on the notion of physicalism. (Between the many possible definitions that I could quote, I wish to remember W. Sellars’ quasi-Protagorean dictum: <<science is the measure of all things, of what is, and of what is not). A physicalist stance claims that (I limit the list to the points that count in the philosophy of mind): 1) physical is what physical science states as such; 2) empirical knowledge is necessary in order to assess how the physical world is; 3) if the mind is reducible to physical states, this can be decided only by empirical research; 4) if such a reduction is possible, this task is still up to an empirical research as is the kind of reduction available (and so is the choice between identity, emergence, supervenience and so on).

I am aware that Crane-Mellor-Hutto would easily criticise point 1: I can only repeat what I said above: surely it is not possible to charge physicalism with triviality, which is referring on the feature of continuous progress in scientific knowledge. To my view, the point 1 is important because it establishes a fundamental difference between the past materialism (e.g., Hobbes’ one) and the contemporary one. Contemporary materialism does not involve any metaphysical thesis of its own, since it entrusts science with the task of stating the constituents of reality. Point 2 eliminates any a priori enquiry: valid information cannot be obtained without the contribution of experience (according to the Logical Positivist thesis: << synthetic a priori does not exist>>). Point 3 is an obvious consequence of what the founding fathers of identity theory (Place and Smart) thought the identity between brain and mental states to be: an empirical hypothesis. Therefore identity theory can be true or false: however, the settling of such a decision must be a scientific task. The demonstration a priori that identity theory is true or false has to be excluded. If we consider identity theory as an empirical hypothesis, then other consequence have to be considered: it is precisely the reason which the Place and Smart’s physicalism is not empty, since it constitutes a legitimate and possible research program on which future investigations can be based. Finally, since there are many ways of reducing theories and also many ways of conceiving the mind-body relation (although remaining in a physicalist frame), I think the empirical research can carry out the same role in points 3 and 4.

Now we come to the issue of idealism, the metaphysical option Hutto defends and by which he means to exceed physicalism. Hutto claims that idealism (in particular Bradley's absolute idealism) is incompatible with physicalism but not incompatible with science. Therefore, we could exceed physicalism without abandoning natural science. Of course, it is necessary to agree on what science is. I believe that it is very difficult to imagine science without, at least, points 1 and 2. Therefore, exceeding physicalism means exceeding science too. I know very well that about the notion of idealism and its relationships with empirical science there are several unfounded commonplaces, most of them have been dissolved by Hutto’s analysis. However we must consider the fact that the notion of idealism still has a series of meanings that have featured in idealistic doctrines. There is not a single point of what I have listed above that would be approved by some idealist philosopher. All German classical idealists considered empirical knowledge and natural science as an inferior kind of knowledge, while they appreciated the pure conceptual knowledge of philosophy. Moreover, the contrast between idealism and science has been particularly strong and harmful in Italy. Here, Benedetto Croce’s authority, who once defined the scientific theories as "kitchen recipes", excluded Italian philosophy from international debate for decades. For example, in his lifetime, Giuseppe Peano had more reputation abroad than in Italy.

The distinction between two possible kinds of monism, materialism and idealism, can also be understood with the issue of the naturalisation of the mental. In fact, once the physical states have been identified with the mental ones, we still have to find out if mental phenomena are physical phenomena or the way round. The decision does not matter (it would be, surely, trivial) if it consisted only, so to speak, in changing sign to phenomena (<<even physicists, in recent times, have given less consideration to the matter: have moved to imponderable matters, like heat, light, etc.>> Hegel, Encyclopedia of philosophical sciences, Anmerkung to par. 389). If physical phenomena "are attracted" by mental ones or vice versa, involves a radical change in the task and value of empirical science (and, consequently, of philosophy too).

Naturalising the mind is not the same as making nature mental (<<but vital matter [... ] lacks [... ] every other determined being, so that it cannot be placed with material things>> Hegel, ibid.). If the mental is a natural phenomenon, and nobody has yet demonstrated that it is not, then science is the obvious candidate to explain it: this scientific task is unacceptable for any idealist.

Among the strongest points in favour of idealism there is the fact that we can characterise reality only through the processes of our mind. But followers of realism think that the question we ask about reality (expression used by Galilei to define experiment) are answered by reality itself. I do not think we can obtain idealism from any thesis that states any form of dependence of the observed facts from the observer, because, no matter how few, the contribution of the facts observed will remain, while for idealism this contribution is null.

Hutto considers Bradley’s thesis according to which <<True is Entire>> to be the strongest point of idealism. This thesis is, as well known, an Hegelian thesis. Hutto’s observations are typically Hegelian when he states that sciences give only partial truth because sciences take care only of partial aspects of reality (Hegel’s consideration comes from the fact that sciences use the intellect rather than reason). The reconstruction of the totality is not possible for the sciences. The total of the partial truths are the Truth, the Absolute Truth, and, for Hegel, the Absolute (i.e. the totality of the finite). Hutto accepts these idealistic claims but rejects the consequences (the ones I have mentioned above) valuing science against traditional idealists' claims. If such an operation is possible I do not know, I have already expressed my doubts on the subject. But the readers of the book can have different opinions and I am ready to change mine. The point is this: let us admit, as Hutto seems to propose, that it is possible to separate <<what is alive from what is dead >>(Croce) in idealism. So, let us admit that idealism is a metaphysical position more coherent with modern science and with epistemology (because of the data of observation are laden with theory) than physicalism. Why should we agree to the thesis that the <<True is the Entire>>? Why should we have to believe in absolute truth and rehabilitate metaphysics? (The history of scientific and philosophical thought of 19^th and 20^th centuries has demonstrated the uselessness of searching for Absolute Truth).

There are two kinds of reductionism: the methodological one and the ontological one. The former implies the latter, but not vice versa. According to ontological reductionism, real entities are only physical entities; moreover, according to methodological reductionism there is a fundamental science (physics) which will comprehend all possible physical entities. So it is possible to think that reality is made only of physical entities but it is organised on different levels which cannot be methodologically reduced. Therefore, also if it is possible to reduce chemistry to physics or biology to physics, it might be the case that theories belonging to levels that are "too distant" cannot be reduced.

The armies that engaged in the battle of Waterloo were made of physical entities - human beings with mental states and brain states - but it seems impossible to describe the historical event <<the battle of Waterloo>> in the terms of brain states of the single soldier. Perhaps it could also be impossible to reduce mental states to brain states (as methodological reductionism requires), but that does not mean no physical events exist too (ontological reductionism). Therefore an absolute vision of the truth could be possible only in one of the hierarchical levels of reality. If only one "locally absolute" vision was available, we would be satisfied.

Paraphrasing Crane and Mellor who claimed that nobody will not speak about physicalism after their assertions, I think philosophers should stop dealing with the mind-body problem: if there were a philosophical answer to that problem we would have (from Plato to nowadays) already found it. If there is an answer, it will come from empirical investigation, otherwise there is no answer (or perhaps no problem).

© 2001 Marco Salucci

Reply
Daniel D. Hutto

There are several points upon which Professor Salucci and I agree, nevertheless there appears to be a real friction between us with respect to our preferred form of metaphysics or anti-metaphysics. Neither of us wish to endorse a traditional physicalism, yet whereas I want us to look beyond physicalism, he bids us to stop short before idealism. The difficulty lies in trying to determine just what Salucci’s forward-looking physicalism or my form of idealism actually commits one to, metaphysically speaking.

In order to provide a frame for that distinction it will prove useful to compare our views on the explanatory prospects of future science when it comes to understanding consciousness. Salucci tells us that:

If in the future, neuroscience will show how mental states originate from brain states and also how some physical systems (brains) have the property to feel what it is like to be what they are, then, I think, this would be a fully satisfactory explanation.

These are big ‘Ifs’. Yet despite this, why should I doubt such possibilities, as I do, in advance of the developments of future science? It is true that today most philosophers feel uneasy about taking such a stand, as science has thrown up many surprises – but my reasons are connected with the kinds of explanation we might be inclined to expect. As I hoped to have made clear in chapter 3, section 2.3, when I discussed the views of teleofunctionalists, I do not doubt the prospects of a future science will provide more and more by way of detail of the kind of physical capacities and processes that underpin the various specific forms of conscious experience. These will be ‘psychophysical’ to the extent that mention will be made of experiences of certain types, such that we may learn more about their causes. Such knowledge would, in theory, permit the control, prediction and manipulation of conscious experience. In many contexts, with such developments in hand we would want to say that we had understood and explained more about the nature of consciousness than in previous times. I would not want to challenge this. What I would ask is: Should we also think that, given such advances, we had provided explanations of the how ‘mental states’ originate from physical ones? The answer depends on the kind of question that one is asking here. The fact is that even if we accept some form of identity thesis, we have every reason to deny that talk of physical capacities does not equates to talk of conscious experiences. As Salucci concedes, there is a subjective residue that eludes capture under such descriptions. It is for this reason that we are at loss to fully comprehend the relation between consciousness and the physical. It is also for this reason that a great many specific questions asked about the nature and location of subjective experience and experiencers are simply wrongheaded. The same applies to the question about how consciousness relates, generally, to the physical. It is not clear to me if Salucci is suggesting that future science might provide such answers. In my view it is conceptually impossible that it, or any other discipline, could do so. However, if this is not his suggestion, that is, if he is merely saying that we can learn more about the local (and if we are lucky, historical) causes of specific types of experience, then I would agree. Yet, in that case, there is a clear sense of where the limits lie in this domain and it is not too early to chart them, even in advance of future scientific developments. To my eye this does go against what some hardcore explanatory physicalists, such as Smart and Place, want to leave as an ‘open’ question.

Salucci claims, "…there are many ways of reducing theories and also many ways of conceiving the mind-body relation (although remaining in a physicalist frame)". However, once it is admit that the subjective aspects of consciousness cannot be conceptually schematised, after the fashion of theoretical posits, the possibility of developing an explanatory theory of consciousness is removed. This is important for talk of reduction only makes sense if we have some idea of what is being reduced and to what it is being reduced. As far as I can tell, by conceding that there is at least enough legitimate force in Jackson’s argument to allow us to conclude that the subjective features of consciousness are conceptually elusive, Salucci has already conceded that there is no prospect of providing a conceptually based reduction. Quite literally, it is not as if we have an ‘idea’ of what it is we wish to reduce or how to represent it.

It is worth emphasising that I did not hope to attack the identity theory by suggesting that Jackson’s knowledge argument had some limited virtues. Bearing this distinction in mind, the point of reviewing the Nagel-Jackson thought-experiments was to stress why it is a mistake to try to produce some kind of theory or conceptual account of experiences which could capture or describe their nature. Indeed, in the end I endorse an ontological version of the identity theory, but one that does not attempt to identify specific types of conscious experiences with specific types of brain states. It is precisely because of the problems of drawing out the necessary conceptual connections that we must balk at the claims of reductive and explanatory physicalists. Put bluntly, merely stipulating that x and y are identical, even if true, provides no understanding of psychophysical relations since understanding must occur at the level of sense. Thus, as I argued at length in chapter three, section 3.1.3., although standard replies to Leibniz’s Law objections are correct in claiming that intensional inequivalence does not rule out the possibility of extensional equivalence, they also highlight the very reason why standard identity theories are not plausible when advanced under an explanatory banner.

What should we call such a metaphysics? Unless, we deny that there are subjective aspects of experience we have good reason not to call it physicalism, for to do so is misleading. Take the childish statement of identity, 2 + 2 = 4. To link such an identity claim to a metaphysics of ‘additionism’ would gives the impression that one side of the equation is privileged. I suspect this is what Salucci sees as a virtue of physicalism – that in emphasising the physical side of the equation it wears its commitment to science on its label. To my mind this is unhelpful. We are told that, "Contemporary materialism does not involve any metaphysical thesis of its own, since it entrusts science with the task of stating the constituents of reality". Yet if we allow that the subjective aspects of experience are real and important, but elude scientific description and analysis, then we should not endorse the kind of privileged, one-sided metaphysics offered by contemporary materialism.

Nevertheless, there is no need to deny the importance of scientific work and investigation as a means of enabling us to better understand a great deal about consciousness, in just the way I described above. The only danger is if this is not handled with care we can be led to ignore or misrepresent its most central and interesting features. We can also lead us into terrible philosophical muddles if we start to model consciousness on physical objects and processes. Against this backdrop, it should be clear that my target in the book is the philosophical doctrine of physicalism - not science in general or scientific explanations as such. To conflate the two begs the very questions that I hoped to address.

From what I can gather it is his commitment to ‘science’ that drives Salucci to defend some form of physicalism. He outlines a number of features that he regards as essential to the doctrine. I remind the reader of two:

physical is what physical science states as such;

empirical knowledge is necessary in order to assess how the physical world is;

Later in his review he says, "I believe that it is very difficult to imagine science without, at least, points 1 and 2. Therefore, exceeding physicalism means exceeding science too." I am not convinced.

As concerns point one, I have no wish to deny that our notion of the physical should be defined by science, not philosophy. Nevertheless I think Salucci conflates the concept of the physical with science itself. Thus, he tells us, "I cannot see the difference between asserting that <<future science will find the cure for cancer>> and <<future science will find the explanation for the origin of consciousness>>". Although these predictions can be meaningful (in the sort of context I described above) they provide no basis for a stable metaphysics, physicalist or otherwise. To think of our metaphysics as defined by some future science is tantamount to giving up on metaphysics altogether (at least for the foreseeable future). This is because ‘future science’ may go in a plethora of directions of which we have no idea and it unclear what affect these might have on our understanding of the physical.

Nevertheless, by lumping me together with Crane and Mellor Salucci misunderstands my position on these matters. When I introduced the notion of an object-based schema I did not do so to support Crane and Mellor’s style of attack on physicalism. My discussion of the objections and replies to the their well-known argument was meant to provide a basis for recognising a stable core to the notion of the physical, both in its current and future uses. This was meant to demonstrate what remained constant in the concept throughout historical developments and revisions of theoretical detail. I argued it is best to see the standard notion of the ‘physical’ as tied to an object-based schema; the concepts of physics, despite their abstract manifestations, developed from and could be applied to ordinary spatio-temporal objects. Introducing the idea of an object-based schema was a crucial step in my overall argument since it enables us to see why the ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’ are not intelligible within a common conceptual framework. It is the failure to provide such a framework that is physicalism’s main failing as a philosophical doctrine. But to return to Salucci’s point one, if one does not use this, or specify some other means, to define our notion of the physical not only is understanding of the physical seemingly postponed indefinitely, we are entitled to ask if it is well-defined even now. For example, we might legitimately ask: What is common to the notion of ‘the physical’ such that it can act as a label for entities described by both classical and quantum physics? My point is just that talk of ‘science’ or ‘physical science’ is glib in that it suggests some kind of core theoretical agreement, when in fact it is more the focus or objects of concern that give rises to the way we categorise the sciences as physical, biological or psychological.

With respect to the second point, much of Chapter 7 is meant to demonstrate that the form of idealism I advocate does not stand opposed to scientific investigation or experimentation. What I do claim is that our scientific judgements are as partial and provisional as judgements of any other kind. Indeed, it is necessary to accept this if we are to understand the nature of scientific progress at all. Understood in the correct contexts, I make no argument against the important role of engaging with ‘reality’ or ‘facts’ in order to develop our concepts or test our judgements.

In fairness, it can be asked: Why should we call such a metaphysics ‘idealism’? Indeed, there are some reasons to be cautious about using such a title for as Salucci notes, "… the notion of idealism still has a series of meanings that have featured in [undesirable] idealistic doctrines". Frankly, I am not overly concerned by the fact that there are a number of views I would reject that are associated with the name ‘idealism’. Nor should Salucci be worried about defending varieties of materialism, other than that to which he subscribes. Worries of this sort are more about marketing than philosophy.

After expressing his misgivings, Salucci allows that it might at least be possible to advance a workable version of idealism that does not devalue science. Yet, he goes on to make a more specific complaint and questions the wisdom of reviving of the idealist notion of absolute truth. He asks, "Why should we have to believe in absolute truth and rehabilitate metaphysics?"

I can only stress that in attempting to revive Bradley’s views on absolute truth I am not seeking to rehabilitate metaphysics of any traditional kind. On my account, there are no prospects of obtaining absolute truth or providing a complete picture of reality. It is important to compare this with the other alternatives, for example a de-contextualised or reductive metaphysics. For given these options it is clear why we should prefer a philosophy that allows for an appropriate quietism on issues where we should remain silent, while at the same time permitting us to acknowledge the fact that we operate within a single, unified world. I think it is a virtue of Bradley’s Absolute Idealism that it relegates all interesting questions to given contexts of inquiry. Moreover, while absolute truth must elude our grasp it is the continual search for it that provides the spur for conceptual developments, including those of science that both Salucci and I prize so greatly.

Whereas I have tried to locate points of possible reconciliation between my idealism and Salucci’s physicalism, I want to end by highlighting one important difference in our views. For it appears that he and I have a quite different understanding of the importance of the mind-body problem. In his conclusion he writes, "I think philosophers should stop dealing with the mind-body problem: if there were a philosophical answer to that problem we would have (from Plato to nowadays) already found it." I too think there is no answer to the problem. But to think that philosophers should ‘stop dealing with it’ is a mistake. Even though it is wrong to think we can provide an answer to it, there is a great deal to be learned, for each of us, in the process of coming to see why this is so. Moreover, it is only by attending to the reasons why this problem cannot be solved in any straightforward way that we will be able to strike the right balance in understanding the relation between our experiences and our scientific understanding of the world.
© 2001 Daniel Hutto

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