<philosophy of mind, ontology> the view that the mental and the physical comprise two different classes of objects: minds and bodies.
Perhaps the most famous proponent of substance dualism was Descartes, who cashed out the distinction between minds and bodies as follows: minds are things that think but lack spatial magnitude, and bodies are things that have spatial magnitudes, but don't think. Different substance dualists may disagree as to how best to define what's essential to being mental and physical, but they do agree that the difference in question is one of objects, not properties. So, for example, my belief that the Eiffel tower is in France and my being six feet tall are properties of different objects, i.e., my mind and my body, respectively.
See property dualism
Pete Mandik <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Chris Eliasmith - [Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind] Homepage
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