<philosophy of mind> the view that the mental and the physical comprise two different classes of property that are coinstantiated in the same objects.
According to property dualism, even though mental properties are totally different than physical properties, they are nonetheless all properties of the same kinds of objects. Thus, for example, a single object instantiates the property of my being six feet tall and my believing that the Eiffel tower is in France. Property dualism is compatible with the token identity thesis, but not the type identity thesis. Property dualists are typically, if not unanimously, anti-reductionists about the mental, which is to say, they deny that it is in-principle possible to translate mental predicates into physical predicates.
See dualism, substance dualism
Pete Mandik <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Chris Eliasmith - [Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind] Homepage
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