<ethics, moral philosophy> distinction between types of value, judgments, or propositions. Although a precise line is difficult to draw, there seems to be a genuine difference between universalizable moral concerns that impinge upon other people and merely personal matters of taste. For example: "Murder is wrong." is a moral assertion, but "This coffee is good." is a non-moral assertion. Recommended Reading: R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Clarendon, 1991); Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson, ed. by Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker, and Ralph Wedgwood (MIT, 2001); and Gilbert Harman, Explaining Value: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Clarendon, 2000).
[A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names]
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