<metaphysics, philosophy of mind> the principle that consciousness is always consciousness of something, that is, of some aspect of reality. This idea is common to most varieties of epistemological realism. A different formulation defines "intentionalism" as the thesis that all mental states are representational states. Specifically, raw feels and qualia, are said to have representational content.
Based on [Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind] and [The Ism Book]
Edited by Giovanni Benzi
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<gnoseology, moral philosophy> the characteristic feature of cognitive states - that they invariably represent or are about something beyond themselves. The intentions of a moral agent are, therefore, the states of mind that accompany its actions. Recommended Reading: Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (MIT, 1989); William Lyons, Approaches to Intentionality (Oxford, 1998); John R. Searle, Intentionality (Cambridge, 1983); Robert C. Stalnaker, Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought (Oxford, 1999); Hubert L. Dreyfus, Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Bradford, 1990); Edward N. Zalta, Intentional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality (MIT, 1988); and Michael Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (Cambridge, 1999).
[A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names]
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<philosophy of mind> the power of a system (e.g. the mind) to be "about" something if that power is derived from that system's connection to another, already intentional system. Language's intentionality is said to be derived from that of the mind.
Alan J. Laser <alaser@iwaynet.net>
Chris Eliasmith - [Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind] Homepage
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<philosophy of mind> the intentional or mental component of an action. The intention in action causes, and is contemporaneous with, the agent's bodily movement or state that is its condition of satisfaction. Introduced by Searle in 1983.
See also intentionality, prior intention, Background, phenomenological critique of representationalism, will
Daniel Barbiero <barbiero@enigma.com>
Chris Eliasmith - [Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind] Homepage
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