<epistemology, knowledge, Peirce, pragmatism, mistake>, <verificationism, Popper, conjecture, refutation, Quine>, Belief that some or all claims to knowledge could be mistaken. Although Peirce limited the application of fallibilism to the empirical statements of natural science, Quine extended it by challenging the notion that any proposition can be genuinely analytic. Unlike a skeptic, the fallibilist may not demand suspension of belief in the absence of certainty. Recommended Reading: Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings, ed. by Philip P. Wiener (Dover, 1980); Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Edward C. Moore (Alabama, 1993); Roger F. Gibson, Enlightened Empiricism: An Examination of W.V. Quine's Theory of Knowledge (Florida, 1988); and Arthur Franklin Stewart, Elements of Knowledge: Pragmatism, Logic, and Inquiry (Vanderbilt, 1997). See also probabilism.
[A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names]
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