<logic> the equivalence thesis states that, for any proposed notion of truth, each instance of the schema "S is true if and only if P" resulting from the substitution of a translation of the sentence designated by S for P, is true. This thesis is often taken to be a minimal requirement on any notion of truth.
Note that the equivalence thesis does not presuppose a correspondence notion of truth. For example, deflationary notions of truth, such as the Quinian "disquotational" notion, satisfy the equivalence thesis.
Dummett, Michael (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Devitt, Michael (1984). Realism and Truth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Whit Schonbein <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Chris Eliasmith - [Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind] Homepage
Try this search on OneLook / Google