<philosophy of mind, epistemology> pertaining to belief, from the Greek word "doxa", meaning "opinion", "belief". Alternatively, also pertaining to states sufficiently similar to beliefs, such as thoughts, judgments, opinions, desires, wishes, fears.
Often the distinction between doxastic and sub-doxastic states is a way of cashing out the distinction between personal and sub-personal states where instances of the latter include information bearing states not available to awareness (like the information processing going on in the cerebellum). Examples of non-doxastic contentful states would be the numbers of rings in a tree's cross-section: they carry information about the age of the tree, but are neither beliefs (doxastic states), nor states of an entity that has beliefs (sub-doxastic states).
Pete Mandik <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Chris Eliasmith - [Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind] Homepage
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