<logic, epistemology, truth theories> a correspondence theory of truth includes the assertion that a sentence (or proposition) is true if and only if that which the sentence expresses corresponds to the "facts" or to "reality".
The correspondence theory may be analysed into three components (following, e.g., Devitt (1984)). Sentences of a type x are true or false in virtue of:
(i) their structure
(ii) the referential relations between parts of the sentences and some reality, and
(iii) the nature of this reality.
The analysis is restricted to sentences of type x so as to allow the correspondence theory to hold of some sentences (e.g., of the type "physics") while not of others (e.g., of the type "ethics"). (ii) concerns the nature of the referential relation, and various theories have been proposed, e.g. causal accounts (Dretske, Stampe, Putnam, Kripke), teleofunctional accounts (Millikan), and descriptive accounts. (iii) concerns the nature of the reality to which the parts of the sentences correspond. A realist will hold that this reality is objective and mind-independent. An idealist may hold that it is objective yet not mind-independent. Obviously, many flavours are available.
References
Devitt, Michael (1984). Realism and Truth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Whit Schonbein <whit@twinearth.wustl.edu>
Chris Eliasmith - [Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind] Homepage
Try this search on OneLook / Google