|

versione
italiana
a cura
di
Jean-Paul
De Lucca
University of Malta
René
Descartes (1596-1650), is generally considered the
father of modern philosophy for no philosopher before him
had so convincingly and radically challenged the
established edifice of knowledge and cultural heritage of
the past while attempting to construct a new system of
knowledge by seeking to give philosophical inquiry new
foundations.
Descartes
was born in a small village called Le
Haye (Touraine, France), which was later
renamed Descartes in his honour. He was educated at the
renowned Jesuit college of La Flèche, where he received a
typical scholastic education, before moving to the
University of Poitiers. After graduating in law he
interrupted his university studies to be able to pursue a
long voyage around Europe. He writes in the Discourse
on Method (1637) that he intentionally left the
university in order to be able to learn from the great
book of nature. Adrien Baillet, one of Descartes’ early
biographers, reports (in La
vie de M. Descartes [1691]) an interesting
detail of these voyages, which is very often overlooked.
In the cold German winter of November 1619, while serving
with the troops of Maximilian of Bavaria, Descartes spent
the whole day closed in a room enjoying the heat of his
stove. Here he had the opportunity to freely converse with
himself about his own thoughts. This situation reminds us
of the scene he describes in his most famous work, the Meditations
(1641).
Descartes
was a very prudent person and discreetly kept away from
public attention. When he completed one of his most
important early works, The World, he stopped its
planned publication because of the outcome of the
notorious Galilean
affair. In this work, Descartes defended the heliocentric
theory of Copernicus
and refuted the traditional Aristotelian thesis that the
celestial world and the terrestrial world were completely
different from each other. He did not publish his work for
the simple reason that he wished to live a quiet life
without any torments. Confiding with his friend Marsenne,
Descartes remained nonetheless convinced of the validity
of his arguments.
Having
accepted the invitation of Queen Christina of Sweden to
act as her personal tutor, Descartes moved to Stockholm in
September 1649. So as not to disregard her royal duties,
the Queen ordered the philosopher to give her lessons at
five o’clock in the morning. Since his childhood years,
Descartes had the habit of waking up late in the morning
because of health reasons. This sudden change, which was
further aggravated by the extremely harsh Swedish winter,
led to Descartes falling seriously ill with pneumonia, the
cause of his untimely death on 11 February 1650, just a
few months after reaching Queen Christina’s court.
Descartes’
genius first became evident in the field of mathematics.
He is credited as the inventor of the branch of
mathematics that applies algebra to geometry, also known
as co-ordinate geometry. He also invented the graph, and
the points on it are still called the Cartesian
co-ordinates. Descartes had held mathematics in very high
esteem ever since his school days at La Flèche. In his
reflections in the Discourse he admits that his
formal education had left him with nothing substantial
apart from mathematics. Descartes was amazed at the
clarity and reliability of the certainties mathematics
provided and it became his lifelong ambition to try and
apply this method to other fields of knowledge. He
observed that mathematical proof started with the most
simple, basic and indubitable premise and moved logically
to a further step which was equally simple. By the end of
this deductive process, mathematics could explain the more
intricate and unclear questions. Mathematics provided two
important characteristics; clarity and distinctiveness.
These characteristics left an indelible mark on the
pursuit of knowledge in all fields, chief amongst which
that of modern science. In place of the old and shaky
foundations of knowledge, Descartes proposed totally new
foundations based on mathematical truths that are clear
and distinct.
The
next question Descartes posed to himself was how this
method could be applied to non-mathematical knowledge. The
basis had to the same: an indubitable premise. Descartes
thought that traditional metaphysics took too many things
for granted, stating supposed truths on the basis of very
doubtful premises. This is where his hyperbolic doubt is
introduced. We do find philosophers before Descartes
suggesting doubt as a means of getting closer to the truth
(e.g. Tommaso
Campanella’s 14 dubitationes in
the Metaphysica) but none of them before Descartes
had established it as the method. Once a basic
premise is found to be indubitable, then one could proceed
logically to deductively reach clear and distinct
conclusions. Descartes’ most renowned application of his
method is to be found in the argumentation he presents in
the Meditations (the full title of which was Meditations
on First Philosophy in which the existence of God and the
immortality of the soul are proven). Using his method
of doubting everything (de omnibus dubitantium),
including his own senses, Descartes establishes one
indubitable truth, that he exists. Put very briefly, in
the Meditations, he goes about presenting his
argument in the following manner. While sitting in his
armchair by the fire place, the first thing he doubted
were his senses. He knew that his senses could deceive him
because he was aware of the possibility of optical
illusions and therefore he saw no reason why he should not
doubt that his senses could deceive. Thus, Descartes
cannot rely on his senses. He then thinks to himself that
only a madman would doubt whether his arms or his legs
really exited. His reply is immediate: what if he was
dreaming? He had in the past dreamt of sitting on the
armchair by the fire looking at his hands. Yet, he was not
really seeing them. So the senses can definitely not be
trusted and cannot be used as an indubitable foundation
for further investigations. Descartes goes on to think
that whether or not he is dreaming, however, mathematical
truths are never false. Two and three always add up to
five and a square always has four sides, he says. Applying
the hyperbolic doubt once again, Descartes imagines that
the creator of the universe is not the benevolent God of
Christianity but a malicious demon whose constant aim is
to deceive him. So even the most simple mathematical
judgements could be false. Can one be sure that this demon
does not exist, Descartes asks? The answer is no and so
Descartes assumes that the whole of reality is indeed the
dream of an evil demon. At this point Descartes asks
himself whether there is anything that is indubitable and
his answer is that one and only one thing that cannot be
doubted and that is that he is thinking, and if he is
thinking, he exists (cogito, ergo sum). This was
necessarily true even if his senses were deceiving
him, and if he was dreaming, and if an evil demon tried to
deceive him. It could not be denied or doubted without
self-contradiction (If I say “I doubt I exist” I am
proving I exist!). It is important to note already at this
stage that Descartes states that it is his consciousness
(his mental activity, his cogito) he cannot doubt
and not the existence of his body. This is the basis of
his dualism.
The
cogito argument (in French: je pense donc je
suis) – remains synonymous with Descartes’ name.
The claim “I think, therefore I am” (the translation
is perhaps rather inept) was, according to Descartes, the
only indubitable truth. He used this as his basic premise
to move on to logically prove the existence of God (which
can be considered a new version of the old ontological
argument) and the world around him. In synthesis,
Descartes posits his arguments as follows. Descartes looks
at the only thing that is indubitable, his own mind, and
he finds there certain innate ideas (an essentially
Platonic
notion). These included the concepts of “self”, “God”,
and “substance”. Descartes then went on proving the
existence of God using an ontological argument (like St.
Anselm this argument is posited a priori
and makes no reference to external world since at this
point Descartes could only rely on his mind at). Using a
version of the ontological argument he “proved” the
existence of God because, he says, the concept “God” (who
is perfect, infinite etc.) cannot have originated in him
and therefore it must have been God himself who imprinted
the idea of Himself in his mind. Once God is proven to
exist, the evil demon cannot be regarded as the creator of
the universe and therefore Descartes could accept the
truths of mathematical judgements (the demon was the only
objection to this). If mathematics is accepted as giving
clear and distinct truths (certainty), we can believe that
the account of reality given through mathematical physics
is correct (scientific investigations such as those of Galileo,
therefore, were not incompatible with the Christian faith).
Thus, through because he could rely on truths of physics,
Descartes “proved” the existence of the external
world.
Descartes’
used skepticism (doubt) as a method to ultimately
defeat skepticism itself because what is true is true
because it is clear and distinct, indubitable.
Another
aspect of Descartes’ philosophy, which was almost
immediately criticised by none other than the other great
rationalist, Spinoza,
is his dualism. Reminiscent of the Platonic conception of
the distinction between the mind and the body, Descartes
held that the mind was a purely thinking substance (res
cogitans)
whereas the body was a purely material substance (res extensa), a mere
material extension in which the mind could function. This
led to his mechanistic view of the body, to the extent
that Descartes considers animals as mere machines.
Notwithstanding Spinoza’s effective opposition to this
doctrine, it nonetheless had an immensely powerful effect
on Western philosophy right up to the twentieth century
and still today a number of philosophers subscribe to some
form of Cartesian dualism. Descartes’ argument can be
summarised as follows: When posits the cogito
argument,
that he exist is beyond doubt but that his body exists is
not an indubitable truth. So, he says, his existence is
independent of his body and therefore he cannot be certain
that he exists when he is not thinking. This means that
our existence depends
on our thinking. Therefore, we are, in essence, a thinking
thing (res
cogitans), or what we could call a mind or a soul. Our body is nothing more than
a machine, extended matter (res
extensa) which serves as a vehicle of our mind.
The
problem with this argument is that just because we are
unable to doubt that we are thinking but can doubt that we
have bodies does not prove that we exist separately from
our bodies. Descartes seems to be implying that just
because we can doubt something we should proceed on the
assumption that it is false rather than uncertain. It is
like saying that just because we can doubt
that there is life on other planets (because we lack
certainty) it is necessarily false – rather than
uncertain – to say that there actually is life somewhere
else in the universe. Descartes seems to be committing the
mistake of using doubt as some kind of proof.
Descartes’
radical division between the mind and the body led to the
question on where these to things meet in the human person,
who had both a mind and a body. Descartes’ answer, which
radicalised his already radical dualism even further, was
that in the human person the res
cogitans and
the res
extensa meet
in the pineal gland. Even if this were true, one could
argue that by locating the res cogitans in
the pineal gland, Descartes was defeating his own argument
that the location was a mode of the res
extensa (body)
and not of thought. Descartes, however, did little to
explicate further his dualist position, which was soon to
be rejected by other great philosophers, even those who
considered themselves as “Cartesians” or as “Rationalists”.
Descartes’
philosophy is also interesting on the literary level,
not only because of his typically clear and
comprehensible style but also because of his magnificent
use of French and, above all, his writing philosophy as
an autobiography. This not only reflects his lifelong
commitment towards establishing philosophy as an applied
discipline rather than mere academic debate but marks
also an important shift from writing in the form
dialogues and treatises. Seen from a contemporary
perspective, where a work is valued for both its content
and its style, this shift acquires significant
importance.
Descartes’
Major Works: Rules
for the guidance of our native intelligence
(1625-28), The World (1629-1633),
Dioptrics,
Meteors
and Geometry (1637),
Discourse on Method
(1637), Meditations (1641),
Principles of Philosophy (1644),
Passions of the Soul (1649). In addition these works, Descartes also wrote a number of Philosophical
Letters
(translated and edited by Anthony Kenny, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1970).
Collected
Works and further readings:
-
René
Descartes, The philosophical writings of
Descartes, 3 vols., edited and translated by
J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984-1991.
-
René
Descartes, Key Philosophical Writings, translated
by E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross; edited and with
an introduction by Enrique Chavez-Arvizo, Ware: Wordsworth,
1997.
-
Ariew
R., & Grene M. (eds.), Descartes and his
contemporaries: meditations, objections and
replies, Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1995.
-
Ariew
R., Cottingham J., & Sorell T. (eds.),
Descartes' Meditations: Background Source
Materials,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
-
Broughton,
J., Descartes’s Method of Doubt,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
-
Caton,
H., The origin of subjectivity: an essay on
Descartes, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1973.
-
Cottingham,
J., Descartes, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
-
Cottingham,
J., The Rationalists, OPUS History of
Western Philosophy series vol. 4, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988.
-
Cottingham,
J., The Cambridge Companion to Descartes,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
-
Cottingham,
J., A Descartes Dictionary, Oxford:
Blackwell, 1993.
-
Curley,
E., Descartes Against the Skeptics, Oxford:
Blackwell, 1978.
-
Gaukroger,
S., Descartes: an intellectual biography, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995.
-
Rodis-Lewis,
G., Descartes: His life and thought, trans.
by J.M. Todd, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998.
-
Sorell,
T., Descartes, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987.
-
Watson,
R., Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René
Descartes, Boston: Godine, 2002.
-
Williams,
B., Descartes: the project of pure enquiry,
London: Penguin, 1977.
|